In The Mind’s Construction, he argues that the right account of the epistemology of mental action has a crucial role to play in an account of how we know what we are doing when we are consciously thinking, and he connects this with differences between dreaming and wakeful states of consciousness. In the book, he also explores some of the ways in which the ethics of belief may be affected once various ontological and agential considerations regarding the activity of conscious thinking are properly accommodated.
Disjunctivism, on the other hand, provides an introduction to disjunctive theories of perception. It includes a chapter on epistemological disjunctivism, which critically assesses forms of disjunctivism that are adopted in defence of the role played by perception in providing us with propositional knowledge of our surroundings. This primarily focuses on the form of epistemological disjunctivism that has been advocated by John McDowell, and it discusses whether those espousing McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism need commit to a form of metaphysical disjunctivism.