King’s College London is one of the top 5 research centres for philosophy in the country. One of its particular strengths is in Epistemology. For the past few years, we’ve been running a fortnightly normativity seminar. This seminar provides the opportunity to discuss recent research in epistemology and ethical theory done by visiting speakers and members of our staff. We’ve also made an impressive number of junior and senior appointments that have strengthened this particular area.
Maria Alvarez, Maria Rosa Antognazza, Bill Brewer, John Callanan, Julien Dutant, Ellen Fridland, David Galloway, Sacha Golob, Clayton Littlejohn, Eliot Michaelson, David Owens, David Papineau, Matthew Parrott, Shaul Tor, Sherri Roush, Matthew Soteriou, and Shaul Tor have all recently published work in epistemology. This work covers a wide range of topics (e.g., traditional epistemological problems, discussions of epistemology in the history of philosophy, issues at the interface of epistemology and philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and practical reason). Because of this overlap of interests, King’s has become a fantastic place to do epistemology.
Selected Recent Publications in Epistemology
- Forthcoming. Reasons, Rationality, and Justification. In V. Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn. Cambridge University Press.
- 2016. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality. Synthese.
- (w/ Clayton Littlejohn) 2016. When Ignorance is No Excuse. In J. Wieland, & P. Robichaud (ed.), Responsibility-The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
- 2016. Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, and Explanation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- 2010. Kinds of Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Maria Rosa Antognazza
- 2015. The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History. British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
- Forthcoming. The Object View of Perception. Topoi.
- 2017. Objects and the Explanation of Perception. In J. Gersel, R. T. Jensen, M.S. Thanning, & S. Overgaard (ed.), In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception. Oxford University Press.
- 2013. Attention and Direct Realism. Analytic Philosophy.
- 2011. Perception and its Objects. Oxford University Press.
- 2008. Realism and Explanation in Perception. In J. Roessler, N. Eilan, H. Lerman (ed.), Perception, Causation and Objectivity.
- 2006. Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy.
- 2014. Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
- 2013. Kant on Nativism, Scepticism, and Necessity. Kantian Review.
- 2011. Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson’s Anti-Scepticism. Theoria.
- 2011. Normativity and the Acquisition of the Categories. Hegel Bulletin.
- Forthcoming. Knowledge-Based Decision Theory and the New Evil Demon Problem. In Dutant and Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. (w/ Clayton Littlejohn) Just Do It? When To Do What You Judge You Ought to Do. Synthese.
- 2016. How to be an Infallibilist. Philosophical Issues.
- 2015. The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives.
- 2013. In Defence of Swamping. Thought.
- 2013. (w/ Erik J. Olsson) Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem? Erkenntnis.
- 2015. Knowledge-How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy.
- 2014. Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness. In B. Bashour and H. Muller (ed.), Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge.
- 2013. Problems with Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies.
- 2014. Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research.
- 2016. Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist. Kantian Review.
- 2015. Self-Knowledge, Transparency, and Self-Authorship. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
- 2014. Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
- 2013. Heidegger on Kant, Time, and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality. British Journal of the History of Philosophy.
- Forthcoming. Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Winning Essay for the Young Epistemologist Prize.
- Forthcoming. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality. In D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. In Dutant and Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
- 2015. Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? Philosophical Perspectives.
- 2013. The Russellian Retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
- 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
- Forthcoming. Lying, Testimony, and Epistemic Vigilance.
- Forthcoming. Truth, Trust, and Testimony. In E. Michaelson and A. Stokke (ed.), Lying. Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. (w/ M. Brownstein). Doing without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief Attribution. Synthese.
- 2016. The Lying Test. Mind & Language.
- 2017. Human Testimony. In Normativity and Control, Oxford University Press.
- 2017. Value and Epistemic Normativity. In Normativity and Control, Oxford University Press.
- 2011. Deliberation and the First-Person. In A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
- 2015. The Nature of A Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic? In E. Fischer and J. Collins (ed.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Taylor and Francis.
- 2013. There Are No Norms of Belief. In T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
- 2012. Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities and Sets. Oxford University Press.
- 2011. The Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge. In M. Shaffer and M. Veber (ed.,) New Essays on the A Priori.
- Forthcoming. Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- Forthcoming. The Look of Another Mind. Mind.
- 2015. Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies.
- 2016. Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- 2016. Closure Failure and Scientific Inquiry. Res Philosophica.
- 2016. Simulation and Understanding Other Minds. Philosophical Issues.
- 2016. The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding. In R. Borges, C. de Almeida, and P. Klein (ed.), New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
- 2013. Justification and the Growth of Error. Philosophical Studies.
- 2012. Sensitivity and Closure. In K. Becker & T. Black (ed.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
- 2010. Optimism about the Pessimistic Induction. In P.D. Magnus and J. Busch (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Science.
- 2010. Closure on Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy.
- Forthcoming. Sound and Illusion. In T. Crowther & C. MacCumhaill (ed.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford University Press.
- Forthcoming. The Dream Present as a Time Island.
- 2016. Disjunctivism. Routledge.
- 2013. The Mind’s Construction: the Ontology of Mind and Mental Action. Oxford University Press.
- 2011. The Perception of Absence, Space, and Time. In J. Roessler, N. Eilan, H. Lerman (ed.), Perception, Causation and Objectivity.
- 2011. Occurrent Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Issues.
- 2010. Perceiving Events. Philosophical Explorations.
- 2008. The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- 2017. Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology: A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Cambridge University Press.
- 2015. Parmenides’ Epistemology and the Two Parts of his Poem. Phronesis.
- 2014. Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.