King’s College London is one of the top 5 research centres for philosophy in the country. One of its particular strengths is in Mind.

Maria Alvarez, Bill Brewer, John Callanan, Julien Dutant, Nadine Elzein, Ellen Fridland, David Galloway, Sacha Golob, Jurgis Karpus, Jessica Leech, Clayton Littlejohn, Matteo Mameli, Eliot Michaelson, David Papineau, Matthew Parrott, Thomas Pink, Sherri Roush, Matthew Soteriou, Mark Textor and Robyn Repko Waller have all published in the subject or in closely related areas recently.

Selected Recent Publications in Philosophy of Mind

Maria Alvarez

• Forthcoming 2017. ‘Are Character Traits Dispositions?’ in The Philosophy of Action – Anthony O’Hear ed. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. Cambridge University Press
• Forthcoming 2017. ‘Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action’ in The Nature of Desire, J. Deonna & F. Lauria (eds). Oxford University Press.
• 2016. Wittgenstein on Action and the Will. In A Companion to Wittgenstein. Glock, H. J. & Hyman, J. (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell
• 2016. Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality. Synthese.
• 2015. ‘Ryle on Motives and Dispositions’ in Ryle on Mind and Language, D. Dolby (ed.) pp. 74-96. Palgrave Macmillan

Bill Brewer

• Forthcoming. “The Object View of Perception” in Locatelli and Wilson (eds.), Topoi Special Edition: Perception Without Representation.
• Forthcoming. ‘Visual Experience, Revelation, and the Three R’s’,  in T. Raleigh (ed.), Varieties of Acquaintance. Oxford University Press
• Forthcoming. Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason. Analytic Philosophy.
• 2017. “Objects and the Explanation of Perception” in J. Gersel, R. T. Jensen, M.S. Thanning, & S. Overgaard (ed.), In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception. Oxford University Press.
• (w/ Matthew Soteriou) 2015. The Mind’s Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action (critical notice). Philosophy 90, 352, p. 346-356
• 2013. Attention and Direct Realism. Analytic Philosophy 54.
• 2011. Perception and Its Objects. Oxford University Press.
• 2011. ‘Realism and Explanation in Perception’, in H. Lerman and J. Roessler (eds.), Perception, Causation and Objectivity. Oxford University Press

John Callanan

• 2014. Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
• 2013. Kant on Nativism, Scepticism, and Necessity. Kantian Review.

Julien Dutant

• Forthcoming. Knowledge-Based Decision Theory and the New Evil Demon Problem. In Dutant and Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press.

Nadine Elzein

• 2015. Review of Review of Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter, by Kadri Vihvel. Mind 124, 495, p. 994-998
• 2015. Review of Freedom, Teleology, and Evil, by Stewart Goetz. Mind 124, 493, p. 338-342
• 2010. Conflicting Reasons and Freedom of the Will. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 110 (2010), pp. 339-407.

Ellen Fridland

• 2015. Knowledge-How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy.
• 2014. Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness. In B. Bashour and H. Muller (ed.), Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge.
• 2013. Problems with Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies.
• 2013. Imitation, Skill Learning, and Conceptual Thought: An Embodied, Developmental Approach. In L. Swan (Ed.), The Origins of Mind: Springer Book Series in Biosemantics. Springer.
• 2011. The Case for Proprioception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10(4), 521-540.

David Galloway

• 2014. Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality. Journal of Philosophical Research.

Sacha Golob

• 2017. Kant and Thought Insertion. Palgrave Communications
• 2016. Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist. Kantian Review.
• 2015. Self-Knowledge, Transparency and Self-Authorship. The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
• 2014. Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity. Cambridge University Press.

Jurgis Karpus

• (w/ Natalie Gold) forthcoming. ‘Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence’. In J. Kiverstein (ed.), ‘Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind’, Routledge Taylor Francis.

Jessica Leech

• 2015. Logic and the Laws of Thought. Philosopher’s Imprint, 15:12
• 2016. The Mereology of Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociecty 116 (2): 205-228.
• 2014. Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the possible, the actual, and the intuitive understanding. Kantian Review 19:3, 339-365
• 2012. Kant’s Modalities of Judgment. The European Journal of Philosophy. 20:2, 60-284

Clayton Littlejohn

• 2014. The Unity of Reason. In C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press.

Matteo Mameli

• (w/ Bruni, T. & Rini, R. A.) 2014. The science of morality and its normative implications. Neuroethics 7, 2, p. 159-172
• (w/ Bortolotti, L., Broome, M.) 2013. Delusions and responsibility for action: Insights from the Breivik case. Neuroethics. 7, 3, p. 377-382
• 2013. Meat made us moral: a hypothesis on the nature and evolution of moral judgment. Biology and Philosophy 28, 6, p. 903-931
• 2013. Evolution, motivation, and moral beliefs. In Cooperation and Its Evolution by Sterelny, K., Joyce, R., Calcott, B. & Fraser, B. (eds.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p. 525-548
• (w/ Bortolotti, L.). 2012. Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 20, p. 203 – 221

Eliot Michaelson

• (with Michael Brownstein) 2016. Doing Without Believing. Synthese 193(9): 2815-2836

David Papineau

• 2016. Against Representationalism (about Sensory Experience). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24:3, pp. 324-247.
• 2015. Choking and the Yips. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14:2, pp. 295-308.
• 2015. Can We Really See a Million Colours? in P. Coates (ed) Phenomenal Qualities, Oxford University Press
• 2014. Comments on Francois Recanati’s Mental Files. Disputatio
• 2013. Sensory Experience and Representational Properties. Procedings of the Aristotelian Society

Matthew Parrott

• forthcoming. The Look of Another Mind. Mind.
• 2017. Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion. Mind and Language 32 (1): 39-64.
• (w/ Anil Gomes and Joshua Shepherd)  2016. More Dead than Dead? Attributing Mentality to Vegetative State Patients. Philosophical Psychology 29 (1): 84-95.
• 2016. Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67:1, pp 271-296.
• (w/ Philipp Koralus) 2015. The Erotetic Theory of Delusional Thinking. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 20(5): 398-415.
• 2015. Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies 172:8, pp 2215–2237.
• 2015. Explaining Inserted Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22:3, pp. 239-242.
• 2015. Review of Transparent Minds by Jordi Fernandez. European Journal of Philosophy, 23 pp. e19-e22.
• (w/ Anil Gomes) 2014. Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions. Philosophical Psychology

• 2017. Agents, Objects and Their Powers in Suarez and Hobbes. Philosophical Accounts of Action from Suarez to Davidson. Sandis, C. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press
• 2016. Self-Determination (The Ethics of Action volume 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press
• 2016. Hobbes on liberty, action and free will. Oxford Handbook to Hobbes. Martinich, A. P. & Hoekstra, K. (eds.). Oxford University Press, p. 171-195
• 2015. ‘Power, scepticism and ethical theory‘ in Mind, Self and Person, ed. Anthony O’Hear. Cambridge University Press 
• 2012. Reason and Obligation in Suarez. The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez. Hill, B. & Lagerlund, H. (eds.). Springer, p. 175-208
• 2012. ‘Action and freedom in Suarez’s ethics’ in Interpreting Suarez ed Daniel Schwartz. Cambridge University Press

Sherri Roush

• 2016. Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• 2016. Simulation and Understanding Other Minds. Philosophical Issues.
• 2016. The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding. In R. Borges, C. de Almeida, and P. Klein (ed.), New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.

Matthew Soteriou

• Forthcoming. Sound and Illusion. In T. Crowther & C. MacCumhaill (ed.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford University Press.
• Forthcoming. “Experience, Process, Continuity and Boundary” in R. Stout (ed.) Process, Action, and Experience. Oxford University Press
• Forthcoming. “The Ontology of Emotion” in H. Naar & F. Teroni (eds.) The Ontology of Emotions. Cambridge University Press
• (with Thomas Crowther) Forthcoming. “Time in the Dream” in I. Phillips (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. London, Routledge.
• 2016. Disjunctivism. Routledge.
• 2013. The Mind’s Construction: the Ontology of Mind and Mental Action. Oxford University Press.
• 2011. The Perception of Absence, Space, and Time. In J. Roessler, N. Eilan, H. Lerman (ed.), Perception, Causation and Objectivity.
• 2011. Occurrent Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Issues.
• 2010. Perceiving Events. Philosophical Explorations.
• 2010. Cartesian Reflections on the Autonomy of the Mental. In New Waves in Philosophy of Action. J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, and K. Frankish (eds.). Basingstoke: Macmillan

Mark Textor

• Forthcoming. Newton’s Intellectual Joy OR A New Look at Brentano on Intellectual and Sensory Pleasure. Centenary Issue of Brentano Studien
• Forthcoming. Brentano’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• 2017. Brentano’s Mind. Oxford University Press
• 2017. From Monism to the Soul and Back. The Monist
• 2017. Brentano on Consciousness. The Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School ed. by U. Kriegel. London: Routledge
• 2015. Meaning, Entertaining and Phantasy Judgement. Grazer Philosophische Studien 91
• 2015. “Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation. Philosophers’ Imprint 15
• (with Gabriel Segal) 2015. Hope as a Primitive Mental State. Ratio 28

Robyn Repko Waller

• (w/ Russell L. Waller) forthcoming. Forking Worlds and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Philosophia
• (w/ Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, and Chris Zarpentine) 2015. Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology 28(2): 279-293.
•  2012. Beyond Button Presses: The Neuroscience of Free and Morally Appraisable Actions. The Monist 95(3): 441-462.