Author Archives: Vlad Cadar

Art|Philosophy Exhibition and Talks on Migration, from next Tuesday

20 Wednesday Feb 2019

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Migration, Meaning, Time: CPVA Artists in Residence

 

Exhibition: 10:00 – 17:00 Weekdays, Tue 26th Feb – Fri 22nd March (Free)

Opening and Talks: Tue 26th Feb 18:00 – 20:00 (Eventbrite Registration Required)

Location: Bush House Arcade, London

More: Link.

Join us for an exhibition, talks and drinks showcasing the latest work by artists in residence at the Centre for Philosophy and the Visual Arts as they explore and challenge philosophical conceptions of migration, time and meaning. This show brings together their recent work and establishes a platform for dialogue between philosophers, artists and the public.

Being an Ally Forum

11 Monday Feb 2019

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Sarah Fine will we chairing the Being an Ally forum on social justice this Wednesday:

Speakers

Carys Afoko
Activist
Co-Founder, Level Up

Dawn Foster
Journalist, The Guardian

Sridhar Venkatapuram
Senior Lecturer of Global Health and Philosophy, KCL

Topic:
Many people see themselves as allies, not themselves marginalized but nonetheless standing alongside members of marginalized groups in their struggle for social justice. The role of more powerful groups can be important, but some attempts at solidarity can also badly fail the very people they intend to help. We reflect on the significant questions and challenges involved in being an ally amidst the changing social justice movements of the twenty-first century. What does being an ally mean? When and why are allies important? And why do some attempts end in failure?

Date and Time:
13 February, 6:30 pm – 8:00 pm
Hong Kong Theatre
LSE, Clement House, 99 Aldwych, WC2B 4JF

More: Link.

Tom Hodgson at The Queen’s College, Oxford

04 Monday Feb 2019

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Tom Hodgson will be presenting:

‘A defence of structured propositions’

at the ‘Linguistic Meaning: Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics‘ conference, at The Queen’s College, University of Oxford in association with ConceptLab, Oslo.

Apr. 25, 2019 – Apr. 27, 2019, The Queen’s College (Shulman Auditorium) High Street Oxford OX1 4AW. (more details)

Dr Chen Long appointed Assistant Professor at Beijing Normal University

15 Saturday Dec 2018

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Yesterday, on the first anniversary of his successful viva at King’s, Dr Kimi Chen Long received official confirmation of his appointment to a permanent (tenure-track) lectureship (assistant professorship) at Beijing Normal University, one of the top four universities in Beijing, with one of the very best philosophy departments in China. He currently holds a post-doc position at Peking University.

Our warmest congratulations to Kimi!

Updates to the Philosophy and Visual Arts website

27 Tuesday Nov 2018

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Vanessa Brassey has led a number of written interviews on the In a Nutshell section of the site, while Sacha Golob can be seen interviewing Scottish sculptor Kenny Hunter and sculptor and performance artist Hester Reeve on video (both here).

For more about the Centre for Philosophy and the Visual Arts at King’s, check out their website at https://philosophyandvisualarts.com/

Workshop on Disagreement and Bayesian Networks, this Friday

26 Monday Nov 2018

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Friday Nov 30th: 10:00 – 16:00
King’s College London, Strand Campus, Philosophy Building, Room 508

Programme:

  • 10:00-11:00 – Julien Dutant (KCL) and Alexandru Marcoci (UNC Chapel-Hill): “Catching Peer Disagreement in Bayes’s nets“
  • 11:30-12:30 – Frederik Joakim Andersen (Copenhagen): “The epistemic significance of moral disagreement“
  • 1:30-2:30 – Josefine Lomholt Pallavicini (Copenhagen): “Hybrid defeaters in Bayes’s nets“
  • 3:00-4:00 – Klemens Kappel (Copenhagen): “Independence and higher order evidence“

Workshop co-organized by The Social Epistemology Group, University of Copenhagen and the Department of Philosophy Formal Methods group, King’s College London. The workshop will explore issues of disagreement, peer disagreement and higher-order evidence from a Bayesian perspective.

Everyone is welcome, but if you come from outside King’s you need to email Julien Dutant (julien.dutant@kcl.ac.uk) in advance to be included in the visitor list.

Nilanjan Das at the Formal Methods seminar this Friday

12 Monday Nov 2018

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Nilanjan Das (University College London) will present at the Formal Methods this Friday, November 16th, on:

Externalism and Exploitability

Abstract: According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update – or at least should plan to update – her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who doesn’t plan to update her credences by conditionalization makes herself vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, pose a risk of monetary loss without any possibility of monetary gain. Here, I will argue that this argument is in tension with an attractive conception of evidence: namely, evidence externalism, i.e., the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world.

Room 508, Philosophy Building, Strand Campus
14:00 – 16:00

Weng Hong Tang at the Formal Methods seminar this Friday

05 Monday Nov 2018

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Weng Hong Tang (National University of Singapore) will present at the Formal Methods this Friday, November 9th, on:

Reliabilism and Imprecise Credences

Abstract: According to the process reliabilist, a belief is justified if and only if it is produced (or sustained) by a reliable process or system of processes—that is, one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs. Given, however, that beliefs are not merely all-or-nothing—given that they come in degrees—a natural question arises as to how the reliabilist may account for justified degrees of belief or credences. Unlike all-or-nothing beliefs, credences do not in general admit of truth or falsity. But like all-or-nothing beliefs, they may be justified or unjustified. Recently, reliabilist accounts of justified credences have been put forward by Dunn (2015), Tang (2016), and Pettigrew (forthcoming). But such accounts focus on precise credences. In this talk, I explore how the reliabilist may deal with imprecise credences.

Room 508, Philosophy Building, Strand Campus
14:00 – 16:00