13 Tuesday Nov 2018
Posted in History of Philosophy, KHOPS, Research
Tags
Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University) will speak at our KHOPS on:
Friday, November 16, 11:00-13:00
Room 405, Philosophy Building, Strand Campus
We look forward to seeing you there.
12 Monday Nov 2018
Posted in Formal Methods, Research
Nilanjan Das (University College London) will present at the Formal Methods this Friday, November 16th, on:
Abstract: According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update – or at least should plan to update – her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who doesn’t plan to update her credences by conditionalization makes herself vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, pose a risk of monetary loss without any possibility of monetary gain. Here, I will argue that this argument is in tension with an attractive conception of evidence: namely, evidence externalism, i.e., the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world.
Room 508, Philosophy Building, Strand Campus
14:00 – 16:00
05 Monday Nov 2018
Posted in Conference reports, Events
Bill Brewer will be the keynote speaker at this year’s MindGrad conference in Warwick on the 1st and 2nd of December 2018.
Details here.
05 Monday Nov 2018
Posted in Formal Methods, Research
Weng Hong Tang (National University of Singapore) will present at the Formal Methods this Friday, November 9th, on:
Abstract: According to the process reliabilist, a belief is justified if and only if it is produced (or sustained) by a reliable process or system of processes—that is, one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs. Given, however, that beliefs are not merely all-or-nothing—given that they come in degrees—a natural question arises as to how the reliabilist may account for justified degrees of belief or credences. Unlike all-or-nothing beliefs, credences do not in general admit of truth or falsity. But like all-or-nothing beliefs, they may be justified or unjustified. Recently, reliabilist accounts of justified credences have been put forward by Dunn (2015), Tang (2016), and Pettigrew (forthcoming). But such accounts focus on precise credences. In this talk, I explore how the reliabilist may deal with imprecise credences.
Room 508, Philosophy Building, Strand Campus
14:00 – 16:00
03 Saturday Nov 2018
Posted in Formal Methods, Research
Tags
The Formal Methods Group runs a guest speaker series. The guest speakers for 2017-18 are as follows:
Fri Oct 12th – Seamus Bradley (Leeds): “Belief models, aggregation and impossibility”
Fri Nov 9th – Weng Hong Tang (NUS): “Reliabilism and Imprecise Credences”
Fri Nov 16th – Nilanjan Das (UCL): “Externalism and Exploitability”
The talks take place on Fridays 14:00-16:00, in room 508, Philosophy Building, KCL Strand Campus. Everyone is welcome, but if you come from outside King’s you need to email Julien Dutant at julien.dutant@kcl.ac.uk in advance to be included in the visitor list.
24 Wednesday Oct 2018
Posted in Events, Public engagements
Tags
John Callanan will feature in tomorrow morning’s (25 Oct) In Our Time episode to discuss Bernard Mandeville’s “The Fable of the Bees”.
You will be able to listen to the broadcast live at 9:00am, or afterwards on the iPlayer.
19 Friday Oct 2018
Posted in Public engagements
Dr Knox appears in the second episode of Dr Hannah Fry’s Magic Numbers series available now on iPlayer.
18 Thursday Oct 2018
Posted in Events, Public talks
Patrick will feature in the panel discussion on:
‘Addiction: What, Why and Who?’
This Friday, 19 Oct, 20:15-21:00
The Science Gallery London is a new gallery at Guy’s Campus, KCL.
The discussion is part of the ‘Hooked Weekender‘, a weekend-long series of events connected with the gallery’s ‘Hooked’ exhibition on addiction and recovery.
10 Wednesday Oct 2018
Posted in Events, Formal Methods, Research, Seminars
Friday Oct 12th – 14:00-16:00
Room 508, Philosophy Building
Abstract:
The “Belief Models” framework is a very general formal theory of rational belief. It encompasses propositional logic belief sets, but also ranking functions and lower previsions (i.e. lower probabilities). De Cooman (2005) shows that AGM-style expansion and revision operators can be defined in this framework. In this paper I will discuss aggregation of belief models, and draw some connections to various well-known impossibility results for aggregation.
08 Monday Oct 2018
Posted in Events, Public engagements, Public talks
Bill Brewer will be delivering a masterclass on personal identity for the Guardian newspaper next week (15th October).
More infromation can be found here.
